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Abstract: This paper explains a way of understanding Kant’s 
proof of God’s existence in the Critique of Practical Reason that 
has hitherto gone unnoticed and argues that this interpretation 
possesses several advantages over its rivals. By first looking at 
examples where Kant indicates the role that faith plays in moral 
life and then reconstructing the proof of the second Critique 
with this in view, I argue that, for Kant, we must adopt a certain 
conception of the highest good, and so also must choose to believe 
in the kind of God that can make it possible, because this is es-
sentially a way of actively striving for virtue. One advantage of 
this interpretation, I argue, is that it is able to make sense of the 
strong link Kant draws between morality and religion.
inTroducTion
Kant bases his proof or proofs of God’s existence on the premise that the moral law is the foundation of a duty to promote the highest 
good, where the latter is understood to be happiness in exact propor-
tion to virtue (CPrR 5: 125). This argument has been interpreted in 
two now standard ways.1 The first, presented by Lewis White Beck, 
holds that, contrary to Kant’s own words, his proof is not really moral, 
but rather is based purely on a belief in the “rationality of morals,” 
that is, in the view that any rational observer would think it fitting 
for virtue to be crowned by happiness and, thus, would include happi-
ness in the highest good (Beck 1960, 275). In this case, the necessity 
of assuming God’s existence would be of the same kind as, and no 
stronger than, the need to explain how such a fitting picture could 
obtain. Therefore, since we can evidently strive in every action toward 
virtue even without thinking the world possesses such aesthetic or 
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teleological harmony on the whole, Beck concludes that the proof is not 
fundamentally moral at all. This interpretation is no longer current, 
perhaps because it does not take Kant’s argument seriously enough 
to shed light on what he wrote.2
 The second interpretation, first articulated by Allen Wood but sub-
sequently followed by most commentators who seek to defend Kant’s 
argument, holds the proof to rest on an implicit commitment to the 
general thesis that one cannot rationally pursue an end that one also 
deems to be impossible.3 According to Wood, Kant believes this demand 
for rational consistency to be a necessary logical feature of ordinary 
practical reasoning. The argument then runs: We have a moral duty to 
promote the highest good as the combination of virtue and happiness. 
But without belief at least in the possibility that God exists, we would 
have to give up this moral end as impossible to attain and thus also 
could not (rationally) promote it. But if we do not promote it, then we 
would be morally contemptible in our own eyes.4 Consequently, since we 
cannot accept such a conclusion about ourselves, we must admit that it 
is possible that God exists.5 On this reading, Kant does not prove that 
we must believe in God, which is what he claims, or even that a moral 
person must believe in God, but only that a person devoted to morality 
cannot also be a rational dogmatic atheist.
 Wood’s interpretation has sometimes been supplemented by the idea 
that, by guaranteeing the success of our moral endeavors to improve 
the world, belief in the existence of God has a positive moral function of 
fighting off doubts and protecting us from despair at the thought that a 
moral world in which happiness obtains will not be achieved.6 However, 
this argument is morally dubious insofar as this despair is supposed to 
arise from the thought that happiness will not be achieved, which means 
we must still be concerned with it in our individual moral deliberations. 
But as the moral agent must seek to follow the law, which “excludes 
[his inclination] altogether from calculations in making a choice” and 
bids him to “put aside entirely the influence of inclination and with it 
every object of the will” (GMM 4: 400; see also Rel 6: 446, quoted below), 
he should also be impervious to demotivation by the loss of any such 
object.7 I will argue in a similar way that belief in God helps to fight off 
doubts and despair, not, however, because it guarantees happiness but 
rather because it guarantees that no happiness will arise except through 
virtue, that is, through seeking to exclude personal happiness as a mo-
tive altogether from our moral deliberations (though certainly not all 
deliberations).8 That is to say, the moral outlook Kant offers us helps to 
fend off despair not by promising eventual rewards, but by providing us 
with a rational strategy for gradually reducing our immediate concern 
for such rewards in the context of moral action.
 Although these remain the two standard interpretations, their 
many difficulties have been well noted in the literature and need not 
be rehearsed here.9 However, I would like presently to point out one 
hitherto unarticulated difficulty with both accounts, which is that they 
obscure the deeper unity of Kant’s moral and religious thought. Let me 
explain this briefly. Throughout his mature works, Kant consistently 
defines religion as “the recognition of all duties as divine commands” 
(CPrR 5: 129) and, thus, as the recognition of God as the legislator of 
the moral law. Kant first presents this definition in the second Critique 
as an immediate consequence of his explanation of the postulate re-
garding God’s existence, stating that “in this way [that is, through the 
moral proof ] the moral law leads through the concept of the highest 
good, as the object and final end of pure practical reason, to religion, 
that is, to the recognition of all duties as divine commands” (CPrR 5: 
129). In the Religion, it then forms the basis of Kant’s description of 
the kind of being we must assume in order to explain the founding 
of a church, or ethical community, namely, it must be a being “with 
respect to whom all true duties . . . must be represented at the same 
time as his commands” (Rel 6: 99). Finally, it plays a central role in 
the Doctrine of Virtue, where Kant associates it with the personifica-
tion of conscience and claims that there indeed exists even a “duty 
of religion, the duty ‘of recognizing all our duties as (instar) divine 
commands’” (MM 6: 443). In all of these texts, as well as in others,10 
Kant treats the moral proof and the notion of God as the legislator of 
the law, which he finds to be central to religion, as conclusions from a 
single argument and, thus, as belonging to one consistent view of the 
moral role of religion.
 Both of the standard accounts of Kant’s argument leave this connec-
tion inexplicable, indeed so much so that those who subscribe to them are 
forced to find two different arguments to support what seem to be two 
unrelated forms of religion.11 The reason for this is that neither account 
sees the moral proof in the second Critique as related in any important 
way to the development of virtue itself; we must believe, after all, not 
in order to guarantee the possibility of virtue but rather to guarantee 
the possibility of happiness proportioned thereto. Kant, however, always 
connects the definition of religion as the recognition of duties as divine 
commands directly with moral striving, claiming indeed that this belief 
will serve to increase the moral incentive itself (cf. MM 6: 444 and MM 
6: 487).12 According to the standard interpretations, it would seem that 
the ground of religion found in the argument for the postulates and the 
ground of it that arises from the attempt to increase the moral incentive 
simply rest on different considerations and serve different functions. 
But this is evidently not how the matter stands for Kant.
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 In this paper, my aim is to reconstruct Kant’s conception of the high-
est good by considering the impact that pursuing it is supposed to have 
on one’s moral disposition, that is, on one’s virtue, before looking at the 
structure of the argument in the Critique of Practical Reason. I have 
adopted this strategy because I think the failure of the standard inter-
pretations stems from Kant’s own failure to make sufficiently clear the 
deep moral reason for including happiness in the highest good or the 
manner in which this reason is embodied in the argument presented 
in the second Critique and elsewhere. What I will attempt to show is 
that we must adopt such a conception of the highest good—so also must 
choose to believe in the kind of God that will make it possible—because 
this is essentially a way of striving for virtue itself. I will argue on the 
basis of this that the two seemingly different foundations for religion 
in Kant stem from a single unified conception.
 Before proceeding to the argument itself, I wish to note that I do not 
mean to argue that the account I will articulate is the only one that can 
be found in Kant’s texts; indeed, the sheer number of attempts Kant 
made to clarify the argument renders it likely that several different 
strategies were employed at different times.13 My aim is rather the more 
modest one of clearly presenting one strategy of proof that has hitherto 
gone unnoticed by commentators. And yet, somewhat less modestly, I 
will suggest that this strategy possesses several advantages over its 
rivals. Namely, I will argue that (1) it is clearly not subject to the usual 
objections of introducing a nonmoral incentive; (2) it is consistent with 
the role Kant attributes to moral postulation in several central texts; (3) 
it provides an illuminating reading of Kant’s main presentation of the 
argument in the second Critique; and, finally, (4) it suggests a natural 
way of understanding the unity of Kant’s moral and religious thought. 
This final point will perforce remain merely a suggestion in this paper, 
as its full defense would require a much more extensive investigation.
1. The moral imPacT oF The highesT good
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant constructs the highest good 
from what he says are two “heterogeneous” elements: namely, happiness 
as the ideal object or systematic sum-total of the objects satisfying our 
natural inclinations and perfect virtue, that is, the complete conformity 
of our wills to the moral law. As he points out, these two objects are not 
heterogeneous because they are composed of different materials but 
because they answer to or are the objects of “quite heterogeneous” kinds 
of motives, which “are so far from coinciding that they greatly restrict 
and infringe upon each other in the same subject” (CPrR 5: 112). In other 
words, pursuit of happiness and of perfect virtue cannot have one and 
the same object, simply because to have happiness as one’s object is not 
to be motivated by the moral law and to be motivated by the moral law 
is not to be motivated by sensible inclinations and, thus, not to have as 
one’s object their systematic sum-total under the idea of happiness. So 
the heterogeneity of the objects reflects the heterogeneity of the motives 
that would have these as their objects.
 Now, one might expect from this that Kant would, at least for practical 
purposes, tell us we must exclude happiness altogether from the object 
of our will. The simple reason for this would be that morality bids us, 
through an absolute command, to seek to conform our disposition—that 
is, our motives—entirely to the law itself; for “moral worth, must be 
placed solely in this: that the action takes place from duty, that is, for 
the sake of the law alone [blos um des Gesetzes willen]” (CPrR 5: 81, 
emphasis added; also GMM 4: 390, CPrR 5: 71). Thus, although such a 
state can never be achieved, the moral law’s ultimate command still
consists subjectively in the purity (puritas moralis) of one’s disposition 
to duty, namely, in the law being by itself alone the incentive, without 
the admixture of aims derived from sensibility, and in actions being 
done not only in conformity with duty but also from duty.—Here the 
command is “be holy.” (MM 6: 446)14
So it would seem that inclusion of happiness in the object of our will, in 
any form, could only detract from our observance of this command. But 
as we all know, Kant does not exclude happiness at all. Rather, to the 
consternation of not a few, he argues that happiness must be included in 
the highest good and indeed in an exact proportion with virtue. What is 
worse still, the reasons for this inclusion seem at best to be irrelevant to 
morality and at worst to corrupt what should be one’s moral disposition.
 As I said in my introduction, I will leave the examination of these 
reasons until after I take a closer look at what Kant says accepting 
his view of the highest good will achieve. The reason for this is that, 
if one looks closely at the texts, I think the answer is both surprising 
and puzzling. What we find is that, so far from thinking this inclusion 
might corrupt the moral incentive, Kant clearly believes it will serve 
to purify and strengthen it. I have in mind two key texts. The first is 
found in the Dialectic of the second Critique, where it plays the role of 
transitioning between the moral proof and the definition of religion. 
In it, Kant comments on how his proof perfectly agrees with the moral 
outlook and indeed also with the concept of the highest good that we 
find in Christianity. This agreement, he says, consists, first, in that in 
both “the moral law is holy (inflexible) and demands holiness of morals, 
although all the moral perfection that a human being can attain is still 
only virtue, that is, a disposition conformed with the law from respect for 
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the law” (CPrR 5: 128). So in both Kantian and Christian morality, the 
law absolutely commands that one act from no motives other than moral 
ones. Second, they agree in that both hold the “worth of a disposition 
completely conformed with the moral law is infinite, since all possible 
happiness in the judgment of a wise and all-powerful distributor of it has 
no restriction other than a rational being’s lack of conformity with their 
duty.” And, third, both agree that happiness does not naturally arise from 
virtue alone and so seek to supplement “this lack . . . by representing 
the world in which rational beings devote themselves with their whole 
soul to the moral law as a kingdom of God, in which nature and morals 
come into harmony . . . through a holy author who makes the derived 
highest good possible.” And now Kant continues, quite remarkably, to 
say finally that both agree in holding that, in this life, the moral law 
must be the “archetype of their conduct in every state,” whereas “hap-
piness cannot be attained at all in this world . . . and is therefore made 
solely the object of hope,” so that “the proper incentive to observing them 
[that is, moral laws] [is placed] not in the results wished for but in the 
representation of duty alone” (CPrR 5: 129; final emphasis added).15
 Now, I have stayed very close to the text here in order to show that 
Kant clearly expresses the view that both Christianity and Kantian 
morality place happiness in the highest good, not to fulfill any rational 
need to believe that virtue will be crowned with bliss, but precisely so 
that we need not concern ourselves with happiness at all in our spe-
cifically moral deliberations. In other words, by framing happiness as 
conditioned by the demand to absolutely conform our disposition to the 
law, and thus as possible only if we do not concern ourselves with it in 
cases of moral deliberation,16 can we even hope for it to be attainable. As 
the last quoted line in particular makes evident, this doctrine of happi-
ness is supposed to have the function of eliminating it as a motive and 
thus of making our motive “the representation of duty alone.” So the 
impact that the doctrine of the highest good is supposed to have is, in 
fact, moral and is indeed to further the moral purity of one’s disposition.
 This same idea is expressed, though more extensively, in the Religion 
where Kant compares one who would do one’s duty for hope of reward, 
thus not for moral reasons, and one who would do it for moral reasons 
alone. Regarding the latter, Kant writes that
the judge of the world declares as the true elects to his kingdom 
those who extend help to the needy without it even entering their 
minds that what they are doing was also worthy of recompense . . . 
precisely because they were acting without attention to it, and we 
can then clearly see that when the teacher of the Gospel speaks of a 
recompense in the world to come, he did not mean thereby to make 
this recompense an incentive to actions but only (as an uplifting rep-
resentation of the consummation of divine goodness and wisdom in 
the guidance of the human race) an object of the purest admiration 
and greatest moral approval. (Rel 6: 162)
Again in this text, the idea is that the image of the highest good as the 
combination of virtue and happiness agrees, as it must, with a moral 
disposition that looks away from happiness altogether. They are most 
virtuous and thus most worthy of happiness “precisely because they 
were acting without attention to it [that is, recompense or happiness].” 
If, for such a person, happiness is in some sense an object of hope, then 
it is obviously not the regular kind of hope that is accompanied by an 
immediate desire for its object, because, in this case, there would neces-
sarily be an admixture of prudence in our motives and these, therefore, 
would not be pure. So the highest good, once again, has the function of 
framing happiness in a way that dislodges its natural function of provid-
ing motives to moral choices. In the last part of this particular passage, 
Kant even suggests this way of framing happiness will have the positive 
impact of inspiring “the purest admiration and greatest moral approval.”
 Hence, Kant clearly gives the highest good a motivational role, but—
and here is the apparent puzzle—its motivational role seems simply to 
be to make the moral law itself our sole motive in choosing and acting, 
that is, its role is to further virtue itself. For, on the one hand, Kant 
asserts that only the moral law itself makes the inclusion of happiness 
necessary (CPrR 5: 109) and, consequently, also that the effect of this 
inclusion will be to purify and strengthen the moral incentive itself. Kant 
is also clear, however, that, in this role, happiness cannot at all provide 
an additional supplement to the moral incentive, for the simple reason 
that any motivation whatsoever that would stem directly from a desire 
for happiness could only hamper the purity of the moral incentive. And, 
as Kant explains very clearly in the Critique of Practical Reason, the 
moral incentive itself consists precisely in the dislodging of all sensible 
incentives from their motivational roles by the pure consciousness of 
the moral law, and thus in a kind of painful humiliation for sensibility 
as a whole, which he terms “respect” (CPrR 5: 78–79). So if the moral 
law requires us to include happiness in the highest good, this inclusion 
must somehow support this humiliation of sensibility, even though, in 
its normal function (when not included in the highest good, where it is 
conditioned by virtue), the concept of happiness is precisely the rational 
goal of the complete satisfaction of sensibility itself.
 To make sense of this, we must recognize that central to Kant’s doc-
trine of the moral incentive is the view that it springs forth by itself and 
as an almost unconquerable motive to action, when sensible inclinations 
are moved out of its way (CPrR 5: 79–80, CPrR 5: 152–57). Kant treats 
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this idea most extensively in the Doctrine of the Method in the second 
Critique, where we find the following passage:
All the admiration, and even the endeavor to resemble this character 
[that is, the character of a virtuous person], here rests wholly on the 
purity of the moral principle, which can be clearly represented only if 
one removes from the incentive to action everything that people may 
reckon only to happiness. Thus morality must have more power over 
the human heart the more purely it is presented. From this it follows 
that if the law of morals and the image of holiness and virtue are to 
exercise any influence at all on our soul, they can do so only insofar as 
they are laid to heart in their purity as incentives, unmixed with any 
view to one’s welfare, for it is in suffering that they show themselves 
most excellently. But that which, by being removed strengthens the 
effect of a moving force must have been a hindrance. Consequently 
every admixture of incentives taken from one’s own happiness is a 
hindrance to providing the moral law with influence on the human 
heart. (CPrR 5: 156)
Here Kant is considering the effect that a representation of virtue can 
have on the mind. In the first line, he observes that such a representa-
tion brings forth the moral incentive within us to the very extent that it 
represents the action as arising independently from incentives of hap-
piness. From this, he constructs the following argument: (1) The moral 
law must have its own intrinsic power, which becomes manifest when 
sensible incentives are removed. (2) If, when something is removed, 
something else is strengthened, then the former must be a hindrance 
to the latter. (3) Therefore, since the removal of sensible incentives 
increases the moral incentive, these must have been hindrances to it. 
In these last two points, Kant makes a moral use of the physical model 
of the composition of forces, something found throughout his writings 
going back to the pre-Critical period.
 This provides us with an essential clue to Kant’s overall argument. 
If the moral incentive is self-manifesting or if its strength can be in-
creased almost without bound by removing sensible incentives that 
would otherwise oppose it, then perhaps the inclusion of happiness in 
the highest good somehow aids in this removal by dislodging the ideal 
rational object of all sensible motives—happiness itself—from its natural 
motivational role for practical reason. In other words, since the object of 
practical reason, according to Kant, is the end that guides it in making 
choices and in designing practices for cultivating its own disposition 
(as means to this end), the inclusion of happiness in the highest good—
where it is absolutely conditioned by virtue (that is, by the cultivation 
of a disposition purified of sensible inclinations) and, as such, cannot 
guide us to make choices and design practices increasing our nonmoral 
incentives without becoming self-defeating—would seem to provide the 
perfect rational strategy for striving toward virtue in the case that the 
rational concept of happiness cannot be entirely avoided. On this read-
ing, the necessity of the inclusion of happiness in the highest good would 
follow from the same necessity that Kant terms a duty of virtue (MM 
6: 390–93); for if thinking happiness as part of the highest good serves 
to increase the moral incentive itself (by providing a rational strategy 
allowing the cultivation of a character able to choose independently 
of sensible incentives), then it will fall under the general command to 
further the morality of our disposition “with all our might” and thus by 
all available means (MM 6: 393). What we would be doing by thinking of 
happiness in this way is essentially framing for ourselves a conception 
of happiness that would undermine its role as a source of motivation 
and its tendency to cultivate our sensible incentives and, by clearing 
this space for the moral incentive itself, would allow it to manifest its 
own intrinsic strength without impediment. Kant calls the former the 
“negative perfection of the will insofar as in an action from duty no 
incentives of inclination have any influence on it,” which is initially 
something painful but is then followed by the uplifting consciousness 
of the ruling power of the law within us (CPrR 5: 160).
 Yet can it possibly be the case that the reason for including happiness 
in the highest good is, in fact, to eliminate it as a motive for action? On 
the face of it, that would seem like quite a paradox. But it is no more of 
a paradox, I think, than the fact that a universal attractive force like 
gravity can push material bodies apart, for example, push a hot-air 
balloon away from the earth. The appearance of paradox in this case 
arises from one’s ignorance of the same internal machinery that, when 
discovered, not only explains away the paradox but even shows the ef-
fect to be a necessary consequence of the law it seems to contradict. In a 
parallel way, a paradox would only truly arise in Kant’s doctrine of the 
highest good, if it were his view that including happiness in the object 
of our will would necessarily mean being motivated by it. As we have 
seen, however, belief in the existence of the kind of God Kant describes 
makes it possible for us to have happiness as part of our object without 
its being a direct source of motivation, since it is built into the very 
concept of God that he will grant happiness only to the extent we are 
worthy of it, where being worthy of it just means willing for the sake 
of the law to the exclusion of incentives of happiness. Indeed, in this 
case, including happiness in the highest good is necessary precisely to 
prevent it from generating nonmoral incentives.
 The doctrine of moral purity—the doctrine that a person must exert 
all her effort to prevent such incentives from influencing her moral 
choices—clearly requires us to make sure as far as we can that no sen-
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sible incentives are mixed into our motives in moral deliberation. And 
if we believe that an omniscient, omnipotent, and righteous moral being 
exists, and thus hold it as a true proposition that ultimately our own 
happiness will depend on and be directly proportioned to the degree 
of moral purity (virtue) in our actions, then we can for the first time 
consistently combine happiness and virtue in the same rational goal of 
striving. This is possible because, in practice, pursuing happiness now 
rationally becomes for us nothing but willing virtue, that is, seeking to 
obey the moral law to the exclusion of all our present or future sensible 
incentives, though only under the assumption that God exists. For it 
is precisely God’s power to proportion happiness to virtue that makes 
this combination rationally possible without detriment to our pursuit 
of virtue and without collapsing the distinction between it and happi-
ness. Moreover, one cannot object to this theory that the inclusion of 
happiness in the highest good ruins the moral incentive by mixing it 
with a prospect for happiness because genuinely pursuing virtue just 
means seeking to disregard sensible incentives in any particular moral 
choice. Of course, for this to work psychologically, we must think of God 
as being able to judge the inner degree of our virtue, that is, the purity 
of our will, and this is precisely the reason Kant gives us for having to 
think of the highest ground of the union of morality and happiness as 
an omniscient and just moral being.17
 Put another way: Consider a person who believed that an omniscient 
moral being had her entire fate in his hands, that this being would 
provide her with happiness only to the extent that the moral law was 
her sole incentive and that having the moral law alone as her incentive 
means cultivating herself in such a way that she could, to the best of 
her ability, be certain that her moral choices were free from all influence 
by sensible inclinations. Now, if she decided to follow the law as a way 
of achieving happiness—that is, the rational goal of a systematic sum-
total of inclinations—this person would undoubtedly immediately see 
the futility of this strategy. For God would know that her true motives 
were based on inclinations and would deny her happiness accordingly. 
And if she momentarily made the mistake of thinking she really could 
pursue virtue in order to achieve happiness, then, although this might 
at first lead her in the direction of virtue (Kant admits such nonmoral 
leading-strings temporarily as stimulants), if she were eventually led 
by this to the actual pursuit of virtue, to the cultivation of a strength 
of character to choose what the law commands unmixed with sensible 
incentives, then eventually she would have to leave behind the former 
conception of happiness, which was genuinely incompatible with virtue, 
in favor of one absolutely subordinated to virtue, which would then not 
be the object of desire but of hope. This new space cleared of sensible 
incentives, Kant thinks, would be filled automatically by the moral 
incentive. In this way, belief dislodges happiness from the natural moti-
vational role it would otherwise have and thereby indirectly fosters the 
moral incentive within us. It should be noted that this does not mean 
that a person is to give up all prospect of happiness, something Kant 
thinks is rationally impossible, but only that she is to transform this 
prospect, through such belief, into something that is merely the object 
of a rational “hope” and that, as such, can no longer produce obstacles 
to the moral incentive.
 One could compare this to the case of attempting to forget something. 
If one tries to do so, perhaps by repeatedly telling oneself to forget the 
matter, ignoring it when it arises in conversation, and so on, then this 
will inevitably have the very opposite of its intended effect. In the same 
way, granting that God exists, obeying the law on the basis of one’s sen-
sible incentives, that is, in pursuit of happiness directly, will inevitably 
have the very opposite effect due to God’s omniscience and justice. To 
forget successfully, one must rather find a way of distracting oneself not 
only from the object to be forgotten but even from the desire to forget 
it. In this way, we may forget only by allowing the immediate desire to 
do so to ebb away. Consequently, we will very likely forget at the very 
moment when we no longer have any particularly strong desire to do so. 
This is not a paradox but a simple and familiar psychological strategy 
made possible by our ability to recognize in reflection (reason) that here 
no immediate desire can be effective and then to act on this recognition 
by choosing to do things that do not further incite this desire. By means 
of reflection, we can similarly recognize that, if a Kantian God exists, 
then seeking happiness in the context of our moral choices would be 
directly self-defeating. This must, in turn, show us the rational futility 
of all practices that would further strengthen our desire for happiness 
and thereby open up a space for consciousness of the moral law to mani-
fest its intrinsic motivating power. When this happens, we can expect 
to be rewarded with happiness at some point, but perhaps only when 
we desire it least of all.
 The final step of Kant’s argument, which I will treat more fully below, 
is then for us to realize simultaneously (1) that adopting this view of 
happiness will have such a salutary effect on our moral incentive, (2) 
that we have the duty of virtue to strive with all our might toward moral 
purity, and (3) that we cannot think the possibility of the highest good 
entailed by such a view of happiness without belief in a certain kind 
of God. The consequence of holding these three propositions to be true 
is that we will recognize it as morally necessary to commit ourselves 
to the belief in God’s existence as the best means to developing virtue. 
This fits the texts so far examined, but does it also fit Kant’s deduction 
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of the highest good in the Dialectic and his proof of God’s existence in 
the second Critique?
2. The equivalence oF The idea oF a Pure buT human  
will and our PursuiT oF The highesT good (ThaT is,  
The TranscendenTal deducTion oF The highesT good)
If the above conception of the highest good is correct, then it must be pos-
sible to prove that willing the law in its fullest extent, that is, perfectly 
conforming one’s will thereto in regard to all possible choices, means 
having this conception of the highest good as one’s object. There are, 
however, already two independent reasons for thinking this must be 
the case. The first lies in Kant’s claim that to be motivated by the high-
est good is exactly the same as to be motivated by the moral law itself 
(CPrR 5: 109–10), while the second consists in the dual claims found in 
several places in Kant’s moral writings that (1) the ultimate goal of the 
moral agent is to become as close to holy as possible and that (2) the 
ultimate goal of the moral agent is to promote the highest good. If these 
are both our ultimate end, then they must amount to the same thing, 
in which case striving to promote the highest good must be equivalent, 
from the perspective of the moral agent at least, to seeking to conform 
one’s own will entirely to the command of the law.
 But a third and more direct route is available to us if we keep in mind 
the motivational role I have ascribed to the highest good. For, on the 
basis of it, we can now see another way in which the second Critique’s 
moral proof might be interpreted. Namely, if we look not at the short 
passage that has received the most attention (CPrR 5: 124–25), in which 
Kant is essentially summarizing a number of points made earlier in the 
Dialectic, but rather examine the earlier and more lengthy arguments 
to which it points us, we find the following. In Chapter I of the Dialectic, 
Kant makes the fundamental observation that, although he had previ-
ously seemed to be arguing that a genuine moral disposition abstracts 
from all ends, this is not his considered position. Rather, ends just are 
the sources of motives; to have an object is to be motivated by it, and, 
to be motivated, one must have an object in view. So, even the pure will 
must have an object as its determining ground (CPrR 5: 109–10). Kant’s 
considered position is, thus, that a moral disposition must abstract from 
all ends that would be given prior to or as a condition of the choice of 
an action; the moral law, by contrast, produces its own object, which is 
termed the “highest good.” In regard to this highest good, Kant explains,
[T]he concept of it and the representation of its existence as possible 
by our practical reason are at the same time the determining ground 
of the pure will because in that case the moral law, already included 
and thought in this concept, and no other object, in fact determines 
the will in accordance with the principle of autonomy. (ibid., second 
emphasis added)
Now, notably, Kant here has not yet said anything about the finite ra-
tional will or about the constitution of this idea of a highest good; rather 
he speaks of the pure will and of what its object must be. He has indeed 
merely made the argument that obeying the moral law will be and must 
be equivalent, for the pure will, to its willing some kind of highest good 
and, thus, that conformity of a pure will’s disposition to the law must 
be equivalent to its being determined to action by the representation 
of some kind of object.
 Only in Chapter II do we find that the highest good, not merely for a 
pure will but for one that is also the will of a finite rational being, must 
also contain happiness in exact proportion to virtue. The short argument 
Kant gives for this is, namely, that virtue must be the supreme condition 
as the Analytic proved, and so must be the supreme good, “but it is not 
yet, on that account, the whole and complete good as the object of the 
faculty of desire of rational finite beings” (CPrR 5: 110; emphasis added). 
Even an unselfish rational being, Kant claims, will necessarily have hap-
piness as a possible object and thus as a possible determining ground 
of its choices. But just a page prior in Chapter I, Kant has shown that 
being determined by the representation of the highest good in general 
must be equivalent to being determined in complete conformity with 
the moral law itself. Consequently, it now follows that, if happiness is 
necessarily an object of finite rational willing and the highest good for 
this being must again be such that willing the highest good is equivalent 
to conforming oneself entirely to the moral law, then the highest good 
for such a being must, for strictly moral reasons, include all even merely 
possible objects of such a will, but in such a way that they at the same 
time do not give rise to anything other than moral incentives. Another 
way to put the same idea is that, if we were to exclude happiness from 
the highest good, then we would necessarily, because of the structure of 
our finite practical reason, retain a view of happiness that would gener-
ate nonmoral incentives.18 If we understand this to be Kant’s basic idea, 
then we can see why he can move almost immediately in Chapter II from 
this to the claim that, in the highest good, not only is happiness included, 
but it is included precisely in proportion to or as conditioned by virtue.
 In his response to Christian Garve, Kant makes what I take to be 
the same argument, explaining that
[w]ithout some end there can be no will. . . . But not every end is 
moral (e.g. one’s own happiness is not), but this must rather be an 
unselfish one; and the need for a final end assigned by pure reason 
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and comprehending the whole of all ends under one principle . . . is 
a need of an unselfish will extending itself beyond the observance of 
the formal law to the production of an object (the highest good). This 
is a special kind of determination of the will, namely through the 
idea of the whole of all ends, the basis of which is that if we stand 
in certain moral relations to things in the world we must everywhere 
obey the moral law . . . In this the human being thinks of himself on 
analogy with the Deity. . . . The incentive which is present in the idea 
of the highest good possible in the world by his cooperation is not his 
own happiness thereby intended but only this idea as end in itself, 
and hence compliance with it as duty. For it contains no prospect of 
happiness absolutely, but only of a proportion between it and the 
worthiness of the subject, whatever that may be. (CS 8: 280–81n)
Here we read that striving to be like the Deity itself, that is, striving to 
be holy, which is made necessary by the fact that the moral law bids us 
to “everywhere obey the moral law,” is the same as having the highest 
good as our object, in which the mere idea of happiness is subordinated 
absolutely to the condition of subjective conformity with the law. Notice 
also that Kant again argues from the fact that we must obey the moral 
law in every possible case (as the “basis” of the determination), to which 
is added the fact that “not every end is moral,” namely, those falling 
under the title of happiness, that finally this special object, the highest 
good, is one in which happiness is included but yet does not generate 
any kind of nonmoral incentive. Taking the highest good as one’s object 
serves precisely to help the moral agent “strive to become aware that no 
incentive derived from that [that is, happiness] gets mixed, unnoticed, 
into the determination of duty,” which is “effected by his representing 
duty as connected with the sacrifices of its observance (virtue) costs us 
rather than the advantages it yields” (CS 8: 279).19
 In summary, I take the moral proof to be the following: Striving to 
have a holy20 will means striving not only to have a will that performs 
certain duties for the sake of the law but also one that is supremely 
virtuous, that is, one in which the moral incentive is so strong that it 
would exhibit such conformity in any and every possible choice in any 
and every possible circumstance. But this just means having a will for 
which it is not even possible to have an end that is not absolutely subject 
to the condition of virtue. As long as the natural conception of happiness 
itself is not included in the highest good where it is just so conditioned, 
we by default retain a rational outlook in which the rational idea of hap-
piness can generate competing incentives and practices. The only way 
to seek to avoid this, then, and to attempt to guarantee happiness will 
not compete for our attention, is to include it in the highest good but in 
precisely such a way that makes it incapable of generating incentives 
contrary to morality, that is, by asserting the existence of a God who 
guarantees happiness will be reached only insofar as we are worthy of 
it. Assuming the existence of such a God will not, of course, guarantee 
perfect virtue, but it does provide an additional means for seeking to 
further it within ourselves. And as we have seen, it will do this precisely 
by combating a primary rational source of nonmoral incentives, thereby 
clearing a space in which the intrinsic power of the moral incentive can 
manifest itself. In a word, we have a duty to promote the highest good, 
not because we must achieve it, but because we must take it as the object 
of all our endeavors; and the reason for this is that to do anything else 
would be a less than optimal way of seeking to promote virtue within 
ourselves. Kant often denies that human beings can be genuine Stoics, 
even though this would seem to fit the moral ideal, because Stoicism 
tells us to exclude happiness altogether, which Kant holds to be impos-
sible. If my argument is correct, then Stoicism ultimately fails for Kant 
because it does not contain the belief in a God that proportions happi-
ness to virtue. The Kantian agent, however, can succeed in acting as if 
he were a Stoic, but only because he believes in just such a God.
3. From The highesT good To The ProoF  
oF god’s exisTence
If the above account be accepted, then this sheds new light on the moral 
proof of God’s existence. For, if taking the highest good to be one’s object 
is an essential means to pursuing virtue, then admitting the existence 
of God, as the only assumption under which the highest good can be 
thought to be possible, will also be a sign of one’s moral earnestness. 
We will not believe in God because it has been proven either theoreti-
cally or morally to be absolutely or objectively necessary to do so, but 
rather we will choose to believe this and seek to protect this belief from 
all possible sources of doubt. This choice will then be a free choice un-
dertaken for the sake of increasing our inner observance of the moral 
law and so will be part of our striving toward holiness. In the Critique 
of Practical Reason, we read “the way we would think it [that is, the 
highest good] as possible rests with our choice, in which a free interest 
of pure practical reason decides for the assumption of a wise author of 
the world,” and “it follows that the principle that determines our judg-
ment about it, though it is subjective as a need, is yet, as the means of 
promoting what is objectively (practically necessary), the ground of a 
maxim of assent for moral purposes, that is, a pure practical rational 
belief ” (CPrR 5: 145–46).
 So it is a free choice,21 and yet it also has a subjective necessity in 
that, just as in the duty of virtue to which Kant ascribes religion, it 
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falls under the command to promote virtue within ourselves “with all 
our might.” That rational belief is something that must be freely chosen 
and that is chosen for the sake of furthering our own moral striving 
is, I believe, essential to understanding Kant’s view of the function of 
religion as such.
conclusion
By way of conclusion, I would like to return to the topic of the unity of 
Kant’s conception of religion, which I broached in the introduction. On 
the account I have sketched, Kant’s moral proof provides the following 
general structure for the move from morality to religion: The moral law, 
as an absolute command, founds a duty to seek holiness by all possible 
means. But since we cannot directly increase the moral incentive within 
ourselves, this command turns into one for seeking to employ every avail-
able means to combat all possible sources of nonmoral motivation and 
firmly to establish principles of thought and practice that support this 
project. Moreover, the sources of nonmoral motivations consist not only 
in sensible inclinations but, more importantly, in the natural tendencies 
of our practical reason to seek the ideal of happiness. Consequently, 
just as we should seek to avoid or to retrain our sensible inclinations, 
we should seek to believe those rational propositions that have the 
effect of countering and redirecting our otherwise rational pursuit of 
happiness. Yet specifically to design these practices and beliefs so that 
they best fulfill this function, there is required knowledge not only of 
our own individual frailties, which must be combated, but also of those 
that belong to us as finite rational beings and as human beings. From 
this point of view, the moral proof of God’s existence is designed to show 
that, insofar as we are finite rational beings—beings with wills who have 
other possible ends than moral ones—belief in a certain kind of God is 
the best suited remedy. Belief in the existence of God as one who enforces 
the moral law, thereby proportioning happiness exactly to virtue, is just 
what Kant means by viewing all duties as divine commands.
 Turning to the argument of the Religion, insofar as we are not only 
rational beings but also human beings, we evidently belong to a single 
group whose members are bound together by empirically discoverable 
laws and regularities. And this interconnectedness is clearly, empirically, 
a source of possible nonmoral motivations (Rel 6: 93–94). Consequently, 
for the sake of virtue, since we are bound to seek out all available 
means to virtue, we are also bound to seek out whatever communal 
means there might be to combating these possible negative influences. 
That is to say, the individual’s pursuit of virtue leads to the recognition 
that this pursuit is possible only as a communal one (Rel 6: 94). We are 
thus bound to join a “church,” as Kant asserts in the Religion, which is 
then nothing but an ethical community designed to hinder those same 
nonmoral motives that tend to arise from society, thereby indirectly 
promoting the development of virtue within each member.
 But just like the highest good in general (as argued in the Dialectic), 
this particular good is not conceivable as possible except through a 
supplement of power and authority from another being. And again just 
as with the highest good, the only being suitable to found such a church 
is a being whose power is used entirely to enforce and effect the inner 
morality of the members, that is, this being is God as the legislator of 
the moral law (Rel 6: 99). Thus, as part of our endeavor to cultivate 
virtue within ourselves, we will freely choose to join an ethical com-
munity within which all duties are viewed as divine commands and in 
which each person seeks to cultivate a sense of community in which all 
desire for happiness is subordinated, in accordance with this view, to the 
common project of fighting, as far as possible, the external hindrances 
to the development of the moral strength of each of its members.
 Thus, on the reading here proposed, Kant’s argument for the postula-
tion of God’s existence is not only continuous with but even provides the 
general structure for the most natural reading of the more specific proof 
found in the Religion. And both agree in being based in the command 
to strive to increase the moral incentive within ourselves.22
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NOTES
1. This is admittedly an oversimplification but a necessary one for my 
present purpose, which is only to present the grounds for a hitherto neglected 
way of understanding Kant’s argument. I will address some of the alternative 
interpretations throughout the footnotes to follow. For an excellent summary 
of the many current approaches, both friendly and unfriendly to Kant’s ethics, 
along with an accurate account of their difficulties, see Caswell 2006. Caswell’s 
own interpretation, however, requires that the existence of radical evil be a 
premise of the moral postulates, although Kant never once mentions it in the 
course of his many discussions of the argument. Although this will not do as 
an interpretation of the text of the second Critique, it is not inconsistent with 
the results of this paper.
All writings by Immanuel Kant are cited by the appropriate abbreviation 
followed by the volume and page number of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften. 
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The following abbreviations will be used: AA = Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, 
CPJ = Critique of the Power of Judgment, CPrR = Critique of Practical Reason, 
GMM = The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, MM = The Metaphysics 
of Morals, Prog = What Real Progress Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since 
the Time of Leibniz and Wolff, Rel = Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Kant are taken from 
the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, edited by Paul Guyer 
and Allen W. Wood, with the exception of those from GMM, which are from the 
Cambridge translation as revised by Jens Timmermann (2013).
2. This is clear from the fact that his summary of the argument is simply 
a paraphrase of one half of a paragraph from the CPrR that ignores the main 
argument that precedes this, as well as the explanations and qualifications 
that follow. Compare Beck 1960, 274, with CPrR 5: 124. Despite the flaws of 
his interpretation, I take Beck’s insistence that, for the proof to be moral, it 
must be grounded specifically in a moral necessity to be fundamental and to 
tell against Wood’s interpretation, which sees the proof as based simply on a 
logical principle of practical reasoning.
3. See Wood 1970; 1978, 22. The clearest account appears in Wood 1992.
4. Notice there is a missing step here. Obviously, we can will what we 
deem to be impossible, which Wood admits; the only problem is that we can-
not rationally do so. Thus, on Wood’s view, there is nothing to prevent us from 
pursuing virtue while not believing that God exists except our desire not to be 
a virtuous fool, or a “tugendhafter Phantast.” The argument is, therefore, really 
a dilemma practicum, as Kant calls it. See AA 28: 385–86, AA 18: 20 (Reflection 
4886), AA 18: 194 (Reflection 5477), AA 18: 484 (Reflection 4255), and AA 18: 
485 (Reflection 4256). Finally, the fullest discussion is in the Pölitz metaphysics 
lectures, 290–94.
5. This is not exactly how Wood initially presents the proof, but it expresses 
the version one gets when all the limitations on its significance, noted by Wood 
himself, are taken into account.
6. See, for instance, Neiman 1994, 162. On such a reading, happiness is 
usually included in the highest good simply as the object to be achieved by acting 
morally. This line of thought is developed most fully in Wood 1970, Engstrom 
1992, and Bowman 2003. It is also found in Guyer 2000, 339–42: “Therefore, 
the highest good, conceived as the condition that would obtain if the kingdom of 
ends were established, is not a composite of two separate ends, one constraining 
the other, but is rather the object defined by virtue itself ” (340). This gets the 
argument backward and simply loses sight of how Kant introduces the highest 
good in the Dialectic itself. The key point is that the highest good is introduced 
to solve a motivational problem, that is, how happiness and virtue as objects of 
desire can be combined. Consequently, it remains true, pace Guyer and others, 
that this happiness is submitted to a condition within the thought of the highest 
good itself, because willing a world in which all actions accord with the law and 
in which everyone achieves happiness (and perhaps does what they should so as 
to achieve it) is still distinct from a world in which all such actions arise from 
a truly moral disposition, that is, are undertaken for the sake of the law alone 
and not for the sake of any happiness at all. See CPrR 5: 112, which clearly 
contradicts Guyer’s claim quoted above:
Now, it is clear from the Analytic that the maxims of virtue and those of 
one’s own happiness are quite heterogeneous with respect to their supreme 
practical principle; and, even though they belong to one highest good, so as 
to make it possible, they are so far from coinciding that they greatly restrict 
and infringe upon each other in the same subject.
The position described by Guyer simply cannot be made consistent with 
Kant’s insistence in the Dialectic that happiness and virtue are objects that 
give rise to absolutely heterogeneous kinds of motivation, and that this is the 
real reason that they can only be thought as combined in the highest good 
through a synthetic ground (CPrR 5: 113–14). Packer 1983 develops the quite 
different thesis that the happiness Kant has in mind is moral contentment. 
This would clearly undermine the moral proof, which Packer does not discuss, 
and conflicts with the sharp distinction Kant makes between happiness and 
moral contentment (CPrR 5: 117–18).
7. Or perhaps better, if the moral agent is not impervious to such demoti-
vation, then this indicates that there is an admixture of motives arising from 
the desire for happiness in his deliberations, and, to this extent, his action was 
not undertaken for the sake of the law.
8. Kant thinks that some choices are morally indifferent, such as “meat or 
fish, beer or wine, if both agree with me” (MM 6:409) and, thus, that happiness 
can be the basis of such choices. The chief point is that Kant believes that, in 
morally relevant choices, we must seek to exclude altogether the influence of 
motives of happiness.
9. A useful account of these difficulties is contained in Byrne 2007, chaps. 
5 and 6; Denis 2005; and Beiser 2006. While Wood’s argument has proven quite 
attractive and does undoubtedly capture some aspects of Kant’s argument, it 
has several drawbacks if taken for the whole argument. First, as Wood admits, 
while the argument is compatible with the idea that belief may have a salutary 
impact on our pursuit of virtue (Wood 1970, 32), it does not show that belief is 
necessary for this reason but only in order to maintain practical consistency in 
our willing. However, Kant consistently maintains that belief is morally neces-
sary precisely because it will have such a salutary impact on the moral incentive 
(for example, CPrR 5: 145–46, Prog 20: 298–99, CPJ 5: 452–53). Second, as 
Wood also admits, his version of the argument does not prove even that we 
must believe the highest good is really possible but only that it is not impossible 
(because otherwise we would knowingly be pursuing a goal we deemed to be 
impossible, which would be rationally inconsistent) and, consequently, that it 
does not show we must believe that God exists but only that it is possible that 
God exists (Wood 1970, 301; also see Denis 2005, 43). But, again, what Kant 
actually maintains is that “it is morally necessary to assume the existence of 
God” (CPrR 5:125). Finally, Wood’s argument cannot at all explain why it is 
central to Kant’s argument that happiness be exactly proportioned to virtue 
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and, thus, ignores the issue, whereas the present interpretation makes this 
very clear.
10. Kant repeats the argument more fully at Rel 6: 183.
11. See Wood 1970 and Wood 1999, 317–19, which treat the postulate of God’s 
existence and his role as the legislator of the law as entirely distinct issues, 
despite the fact Kant always treats them as closely related. See also Palmquist 
2009, which also treats them as entirely distinct and argues that the proof in 
the Religion is essentially different from that of the postulate.
12. Kant indeed states that the duty of religion “is a duty of the human 
being to himself, that is, it is not objective, an obligation to perform certain 
services for another, but only subjective, for the sake of strengthening the moral 
incentive in our own lawgiving reason” (MM 6: 487; emphasis added).
13. Denis 2005 is the best overview of the different possible strategies one 
might find in Kant’s writings. Notably, the interpretation put forward in this 
paper is not discussed.
14. This fact is sometimes overlooked due to Kant’s tendency to contrast vir-
tue and holiness. In such passages, Kant nearly always explains, however, that, 
although virtue can never be holiness at any moment, holiness is still the model 
toward which it strives (GMM 5: 85; GMM 5: 122; GMM 5: 128; Rel 6: 161).
15. The reader will note that the argument of this paper rests on a strict 
or rigorist understanding of moral motivation in Kant. The best, most careful, 
and, in my view, most accurate version of this view is defended in Timmermann 
2009.
16. Notice that my claim is not that, in Kant’s view, we should not concern 
ourselves with happiness at all. This would be far too strong. The key idea is 
that we should not concern ourselves with it when making a morally relevant 
decision.
17. I think that Kant is here making use of a quite commonsense way of 
thinking about moral purity and our relation to God. What better way for a 
person concerned with happiness and yet at heart committed to her own moral 
purity (that is, purity of her intentions) to solve this conflict within herself than 
to think of her happiness as dependent on a being who knows her innermost 
thoughts and will only give her happiness if she seeks to exclude its influence 
whenever she meets an actual moral choice? The important point is that failure 
to solve this conflict will prevent such a person from being fully committed to 
virtue, and so, to the extent she is so committed, she will chose to resolve the 
problem through rational belief.
18. Is it necessary or merely possible that the exclusion of happiness would 
generate nonmoral incentives? Since the role of all objects of rational willing, 
including happiness, is to guide our choices and practices that further cultivate 
our disposition for that end, it would seem almost certainly to do so. However, 
this strong claim is not necessary for my argument since one who genuinely 
strives to be virtuous would seek to fight this even if it were merely a strong 
possibility. Thanks to an anonymous reader for raising this question.
19. Quoted also in Guyer 2000, 344.
20. Kant defines “holiness” as where “choice is rightly represented as inca-
pable of any maxim that could not at the same time be objectively a law” and 
says that it is “a practical idea, which must necessarily serve as a model to 
which all finite rational beings can only approximate without end and which 
the pure moral law, itself called holy because of this, constantly and rightly 
holds before their eyes” (CPrR 5: 32). See also note 11 above.
21. In the Progress Essay, which Kant never completed, he makes this very 
point most forcefully, referring to such belief twice as “a free affirmation” and 
as one “without which it [that is, belief ] would also have no moral value” (Prog 
20: 298). Compare this with Wood 1992, 404: “When he describes moral faith 
as arising from a ‘voluntary decision of the judgment’, Kant seems to suggest 
that he thinks (what is clearly false) that we have the ability to believe in God 
and immortality just by deciding to.”
22. This essay was completed with support from The American University 
of Beirut and the Fox Center for Humanistic Inquiry, Emory University. I would 
like to thank the participants in the SNAKS study group who heard an earlier 
version of this paper for their helpful feedback.
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